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 [转帖] Sanya Initiative |
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天蝎座的
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头衔: 海归中将
声望: 博导
加入时间: 1970/01/01
文章: 3185
来自: S.F
海归分: 507616
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作者：天蝎座的 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
“A Briefing on the Sanya Initiative”
Friday, June 6, 2008
11:45 a.m. – 1:00 p.m.
Event Summary
On June 6, 2008, three retired senior military leaders and participants in the Sanya Initiative spoke to an audience at CSIS about the goals and outcomes of the February
2008 meeting. Held on Hainan Island, China, the Initiative brought together nine retired senior military figures from China and the United States for a discussion of the U.S.-China relationship. At the CSIS briefing, Admiral William A. Owens, the delegation leader and former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provided a brief overview of the nature of the initiative and the February meeting. General Ronald R. Fogleman,
former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, and General John M. Keane, former Vice
Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, discussed their thoughts about the February dialogue and
the U.S.-China relationship more generally. The meeting was moderated by Derek
Mitchell, Senior Fellow and Director for Asia in the International Security Program at
CSIS. Stephen Flanagan, Senior Vice President and Director of the International
Security Program at CSIS, introduced the panel.
Admiral William A. Owens
Admiral Owens began by presenting a brief introduction of the goals and nature of the
Sanya Initiative. He shared his analysis of the February meeting, media coverage in both
the United States and China, and future prospects for the initiative:
The goals of the initiative were to establish trust and confidence between both sides, to
promote better exchange between the U.S. and Chinese militaries, to convey accurate and
relevant information to key decision-makers, and to continue to encourage joint
cooperation. With these goals in mind, four U.S. generals (the three participants plus
General Charles E. Wilhelm) met five Chinese generals in February in Hainan, China.
The agenda of the meeting included discussions about defense policy in the two
countries, military-to-military relations, and issues ranging from Taiwan to China’s
military budget.
Media responses to the February dialogue were much more extensive and favorable in
China than in the United States. Some of the limited coverage that the initiative received
in the United States was negative, particularly from the Washington Times. The
participants pledged after the February dialogue to maintain continuous communication
through various channels such as personal letters, bi-monthly telecommunications, and a
second meeting to be convened later this year.
General Ronald R. Fogleman
General Fogleman focused his initial remarks on the importance of how the U.S. views
China in the bilateral relationship. He noted historical trends within the bilateral
relationship, and briefly commented on how ties can be improved:
The relationship between the United States and China is the single most important
international relationship the United States will have in the 21st century. In reality, within
a spectrum of potential relationships that includes (from cordiality to animosity) –
“friend, ally, competitor, adversary, enemy” – China is not an enemy. But if the United
States is left to its own devices, it could make China its enemy through its own actions.
The U.S.-China relationship is characterized by an ebb and flow of high to low buildups
of trust and cooperation. Traditionally, an initial low level of trust turns into a rapid
buildup after a crisis point. Subsequently, however, the relationship returns to a low level
of trust after the crisis has been forgotten. While the frequency of these ebbs and flows is
increasing over time, the downside of this cyclical process of highs and lows is that it will
require a long period of time to achieve sustained cooperation between the two countries.
Improving this shifting relationship will require people-to-people interactions.
General John M. Keane
General Keane continued the discussion on the importance and nature of the U.S.-China
relationship. He outlined his takeaways from the dialogue, including the Chinese
generals’ perceptions of bilateral relations and the nature of the meeting itself:
The U.S.-China relationship is the single most important international relationship the
United States will have in the 21st century. There is plenty of room for miscalculation and
mischief by both sides in the relationship. However, greater understanding between the
two sides can help avoid these potential miscalculations.
U.S. and Chinese participants found that they had many common ties between them such
as travelling abroad and their careers of service to their respective countries. The Chinese
generals became less stiff and more willing to talk freely as the meeting progressed.
Much time was spent talking about the issue of Taiwan. The Chinese generals seemed to
have a genuine respect for the United States and possessed more than a surface
understanding of U.S politics, particularly on the issue of 9/11 and its psychological
effects on a nation that has rarely been attacked domestically in its history. But the
Chinese were also sensitive to criticisms from the United States and “China bashing”
from various parts of the U.S. political spectrum. Despite assurances by the U.S. generals
that the criticism was in part election season rhetoric, the Chinese responded by asking
how the generals would feel if these things were said about their families.
Questions/Comments and Responses
In response to a question on whether crisis management mechanisms were discussed
at the February meeting, Admiral Owens noted that there were restrictions on U.S.-
China cooperation on issues such as crisis management mechanisms. If Americans
wish to understand or have friendly relations with China, they must be aware of the
National Defense Authorization Act of 2000, which imposes restrictions on U.S.-
China military cooperation. The Chinese participants knew much more about the
NDAA than the U.S. participants. General Fogleman favored the establishment of a
hotline as one way to reduce the potential for miscalculations, but he also noted the
lack of a senior level structure in China which made it difficult to ascertain who
should be at the other end of such a hotline. Regarding miscalculation, he said that
despite China’s use of words like “hegemony,” “superpower,” and bipolarity” in its
discourse, the Chinese generals recognized that their country was neither a
superpower nor ready to become one. He emphasized the fact that there were limits to
China’s ‘sensitivity’, as evidenced by the lack of a major Chinese response when the
U.S. shot down a satellite while the dialogue was being held.
In response to a question on the controversy over the dialogue within the U.S. media,
including the inclusion of former military intelligence chief General Xiong Guangkai
as the leader of the Chinese delegation, Admiral Owens argued that the question of
the general’s reputation reflected Western misconceptions about the dialogue itself.
Observers in the United States and elsewhere misconstrued the dialogue as an
opportunity for China to tell the United States what to do differently. In fact, the
dialogue was not about General Xiong or Chinese lessons for the United States, but a
way to encourage a “spirit of togetherness.” Admiral Owens added that he wondered
why people were opposed to dialogue.
General Fogleman added that if the Chinese participants emphasized the importance
of the Taiwan issue above all other topics. They stressed the seriousness of the issue
and that U.S. actions, even when inadvertent, could complicate matters. In addition,
when asked what messages they would like communicated to government officials
back in the United States, the Chinese generals said they felt it would be helpful if the
Department of Defense annual report on the China’s military power were released
after the Taiwan election this year. General Fogleman called government officials to
propose this, but a press conference had already been scheduled for the report’s
release and the timeline was not changed.
In response to a question on whether the U.S. delegation raised the issue of China’s
lack of transparency in its military buildup, Admiral Owens said that while in some
regards, criticism of China’s lack of transparency is valid, it is sometimes exaggerated
or misplaced, as in the allegations about the Sanya military base. Owens has the sense
that the Chinese government might not know how to conduct its affairs transparently.
He argued that the Chinese generals knew their country was neither a superpower nor
interested in becoming one, and that China is a domestically-oriented country with
border issues to resolve, rather than one moving toward imperialism. He stressed the
need to focus on understanding China’s intent, which is cautious, peaceful, and
domestically-oriented, rather than threatening or revisionist. He also suggested that
one interpretation of transparency might include greater contact and communication
with the Chinese government.
General Fogleman said he had trouble understanding what exactly constituted
transparency himself, so it was no surprise that the Chinese government had a
different perspective regarding the issue. He noted that during the dialogue, the
Chinese generals themselves asked the U.S. participants why they found the Sanya
base surprising at all, since China was merely safeguarding its interests in the
Malacca Straits and Taiwan. He also noted encouraging evidence of increased
transparency and cooperation, including Beijing’s willingness to allow for
international assistance after the earthquake.
When asked whether the Chinese generals suggested any proposals for NDAA 2000
reform, Admiral Owens clarified that the NDAA comments by the Chinese side were
made in response to the U.S. participants’ question about what messages should be
taken back to the United States, and that this did not seem to be a prepared agenda
item. He recommended that the United States seek to engage China in international
efforts on challenges such as piracy and peacekeeping and stated that this type of
cooperation would benefit the United States.
In response to a question on how the two countries could proceed in broadening
military-to-military relations at various levels, Admiral Owens argued that meetings
with senior level defense officials of another country cannot be substituted with
communiqués and other forms of communication. He proposed engaging China at all
levels in a thoughtful and constructive manner, because one can engage without
giving too much away and there is much to be gained. On specific initiatives for
cooperation, Admiral Owens highlighted that the program which brings Chinese 1-
star generals to Harvard has been reinstituted. He proposed trying to further increase
the links between young officers in both countries and urging U.S. officers to learn
Mandarin Chinese. In addition, he emphasized the need for a senior official exchange
without any preconceived agenda for the sole purpose of sharing views in a relaxed
way.
In response to a question on whether the Chinese participants relayed information and
suggestions from the Sanya Initiative to officials in Beijing, as the U.S. participants
did, Admiral Owens replied that while he did not have direct evidence, he has heard
from sources that the Chinese generals did go back to brief Beijing about the
dialogue.
[End.]
作者：天蝎座的 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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 [转帖] Sanya Initiative -- 天蝎座的 - (11555 Byte) 2011-7-11 周一, 16:37 (1316 reads)
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