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 《远东经济评论》:新左派（New Left）的崛起The Rise of China’s New Left |
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仰望星空
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作者：仰望星空 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
From: Far Eastern Economic Review
April 2007
《远东经济评论》4月号
by Leslie Hook
作者：雷思莉·虎克（Leslie Hook）
Wang Shaoguang, a professor of politics at Chinese University in Hong Kong, leans forward in his chair, beaming, and says that China is at a tipping point. “I call it the ‘great transformation,’” he exclaims. “In addition to economic policy, for the first time China now has social policies.” Before economic reform it was not necessary to have a separate social policy, he says, because society and economy were deeply intertwined.
香港中文大学政治学教授王绍光（Wang Shaoguang）一脸欣悦地斜靠在椅子里，表示中国正处在一个“引爆点（tipping point）”[1]上。“我称之为‘大转变（great transformation）’，” 他解释说，“除了经济政策外，中国如今第一次有了社会政策。”他说，因为社会和经济是深深交织在一起的，所以在经济改革之前并没有必要拥有一个独立的社会政策。
For Mr. Wang this shift, long overdue, is good news. This articulate former Yale professor is one of a loose grouping of Chinese intellectuals, dubbed the “new left,” who point to rising income inequality and argue that the country’s emphasis on economic growth should be leavened with social democratic policies that redistribute wealth. And that is precisely what is starting to happen.
对王绍光来说，这个转变尽管迟来许久，但仍是个好消息。这位思路清晰的前耶鲁大学教授是一个被称为“新左派（new left）”的中国知识分子松散群体的一员，他们的矛头指向收入增长不均，并认为国家注重经济增长的同时，应该揉入实施财富再分配的社会民主主义政策。而这一政策目前恰恰开始出现。
The social policy trend is linked to a revival of central government power. In 1995, the government’s tax revenue as a share of GDP reached a nadir of 9.9%. After a concerted effort to improve collection, last year the figure reached 18.1%, roughly the level of 1987. And of course real GDP has tripled in that same period, meaning the government has plenty of cash to beef up the military, invest in infrastructure and still spend more on social welfare.
社会政策的趋向同中央政府权力的复兴也是联系在一起的。1995年，政府税收在GDP份额中的比例跌到9.9%的最低点。在经过一番协商努力，改进税收收缴之后，去年这一比例达到18.1%，大抵等于1987年的水平。当然，同期的实际GDP已经翻了两番，表明政府有大量财力可用于加强军事、投资基础设施，以及在社会福利方面增加开支。
The rebound in fiscal muscle tracks with Mr. Wang’s diagnosis of the current transformation. “Economy and society were embedded during socialist times, then became disembedded and now they are becoming re-embedded,” he says. “You see this in health care and education especially.” He explains that state withdrawal from areas like health care and education during the heady economic reform of the 1980s and 1990s left huge inequities that are now beginning to be filled.
财力的复原同王绍光对当前转变的诊断相一致。“在社会主义时代，经济和社会是嵌在一起的，后来彼此剥离，如今正重新嵌到一起，”他说，“在卫生保健和教育领域，尤其可见。”他解释说，在二十世纪八十和九十年代那段快速经济改革时期，政府从诸如卫生保健和教育这些领域的撤出导致了巨大的不公平，现在就要开始填补这些不公。
China’s policy track record bears out this observation. The annual legislative plan released Feb. 27 in anticipation of the National People’s Congress put it thus: “Because China now places economic growth and social development on an equal footing, there will be more laws dealing with social issues in the next few years.” And in his opening speech to the NPC on March 5, Premier Wen Jiabao pointed out that last year government spending on education and health increased 39.4% and 65.4%, respectively, from the previous year.
中国政策的变化记录证实了这一观察。全国人大开会之前于2月27日公布的年度立法计划这样说：“由于当前中国将经济增长和社会发展同等对待，未来几年内将会有更多涉及社会议题的法律出台。”此外，3月5日总理温家宝在全国人大的公开演讲中指出，去年政府用于教育和卫生保健领域的支出分别比上一年增加了39.4%和 65.4%。
But the shift goes beyond just spending money on the poor. That is clear from the contentious debate over the Property Law that has haunted the NPC for years. The legislation was tabled and failed to pass six times at the annual Congress—setting a record in China’s legislative history—before it went through with substantial changes this year. Even now the law remains controversial because it codifies the individual’s right to own land in a state that was founded on the principle of communal ownership. And within society, enthusiasm for free enterprise seems to have peaked.
但这种转变超越了单单只是在穷人身上花钱。这从对已困扰全国人大多年的《物权法（Property Law）》的争论中可以明显看出来。在今年完成相当大的修改之前，该立法一再被搁置，6次未能在每年一度的大会上通过，开创了中国立法史上的一项记录。尽管如此，这项法律仍存有争议，因为它将个人拥有土地的权利写入了一个基于公有制原则的国家的法典之中。而且在社会上，对自由企业的热衷似乎也已达到了顶峰。
Since 1992 when Deng Xiaoping made his Southern Tour and reinvigorated the reform process, pragmatism has been the order of the day. The conflicts within the upper echelons of the Communist Party were between rival patronage networks, not policy factions. So it is striking that today, even though the leadership is still dominated by technocrats, ideology is making a limited comeback.
自从1992年邓小平南巡讲话并加快了改革进程以来，实用主义一直主导着议事日程。共产党上层内部的斗争发生在彼此竞争的庇护网之间，而不是不同的政策派别之间。因此，虽然如今的领导层仍由技术官僚主导，但意识形态正有限地东山再起就尤为引人注目。
The debate rages not just on the floors of the Congress, but across China’s intellectual circles: How to successfully reconcile open markets with the country’s communist legacy? The days of dismissing contradictions by invoking Mr. Deng’s catchphrase “socialism with Chinese characteristics” are over.
这场争论不仅充斥于全国人大的各个楼层，也席卷了中国的知识界：如何成功地将开放市场同本国的共产主义传统协调起来？援用邓小平“有中国特色社会主义”的政治标语来消除矛盾的日子已经过去了。
Rise of a Movement
一项“运动”的崛起
In the five years since Communist Party Secretary Hu Jintao’s rise to power, the new left has emerged with a range of prescriptions for a troubled society. Although the name is something of a misnomer—left and right are understood quite differently in China than in Europe or the United States—the term generally describes people who oppose a neoliberal market economy, want increased social welfare, argue for greater democratic participation (but without formal elective democracy), and support more assertive foreign policies.
在共产党总书记胡锦涛掌权5年里，新左派已经为这个纷乱不断的社会开出了一系列药方。尽管其名称是一种误称——在中国，对“左”和“右”的理解与欧洲或美国完全不同——该术语通常指代的是那些反对自由主义市场经济、希望增加社会福利、要求更多的民主参与（但没有正式的选举民主），以及支持更加自负的外交政策的人们。
“Its basic features include caring about the poor and the underprivileged and being critical of runaway development,” says Zhang Xudong, a professor of comparative literature at New York University who has been identified as new left. Mr. Zhang, who was reached in a telephone interview, also cited the rise of the nouveau riche, official corruption, pollution and the “destruction of the countryside” as primary concerns for this group.
“它的基本特点包括：关注穷人以及社会下层，并对失控的发展不满，”纽约大学比较文学教授张旭东（Zhang Xudong）说。张也被视为新左派，他在接受电话采访时还提到，暴发户的崛起、官员腐败、污染以及“对乡村的破坏”也是这一群体的主要关切。
The new left has been talking about these issues for long time, but the dramatic deterioration of China’s environment and rural areas in recent years has thrown these topics into the national spotlight. In 2004 over 70,000 incidents of rural unrest, many due to illegal land seizure by corrupt officials, were reported, and the social fabric of China’s countryside continues to decay as able-bodied men and women migrate to cities to seek employment.
新左派已经谈论这些话题多时，但近年来中国环境和乡村地区的急剧恶化将这些话题抛到了全国的聚光灯下。据报道，2004年发生了超过7万起农村骚乱事件，其中许多是由于腐败官员非法征用土地，而且，由于体力强壮的男女移居城市就业，中国农村的社会结构继续老化。
The increasingly dire situation has undoubtedly been a boost to the new left. Prof. Wang says that six or seven years ago universities in China were almost complete dominated by liberals, but that is no longer the case. “Why? Because society changed. People think about issues that they didn’t before.” Others described the new left as having “a lot of appeal.”
日益严峻的形势无疑是对新左派的一份宣传。王绍光教授表示，六、七年前，中国大学几乎完全被自由主义者把持，但现在情况不再如此了。“为什么？因为社会变化了。人们考虑起那些以前不曾考虑的问题。”其他人形容新左派具有“很大的吸引力”。
The term new left itself is problematic, though. Some who bear the label cringe at its associations with the “old left” hardliners who genuinely wish for a return to Mao’s era. “In the very beginning, ‘new left’ was not a word I used myself, it was a word other people used to criticize me,” says Wang Hui, a professor in the department of Chinese language and literature at Tsinghua University and co-editor of the influential monthly magazine Dushu.
但是新左派的术语本身是有问题的。一些贴有这一标签的人害怕被与那些诚心希望回到毛泽东时代的“老左派（old left）”强硬派联想到一起。“一开始，我自己不用‘新左派’这个词，它是其他人用来批评我的一个用词，”清华大学中国语言文学系教授汪晖（Wang Hui）如此说，他还是颇有影响力的《读书》月刊的共同编辑。
The reasons behind intellectuals’ reservations towards the label are linked to the seismic shifts in China’s political climate over the last decades. Mr. Zhang identifies three stages in the development of the new left: “When it first emerged it was purely academic, and referred very specifically to overseas Chinese students who studied with American or European leftist intellectuals. They were very critical of marketization, privatization, the rolling back of the welfare state.”
在知识分子对这一标签态度保留的背后，其原因涉及到过去几十年来中国政治气候的地震式变迁。张旭东将新左派的发展分为三个阶段：“一开始出现时是纯学术性的，非常专门地指代那些研究美国或欧洲左翼知识分子的身居海外的中国学生。他们对自由市场经济化、私有化以及从福利国家往后退步非常不满。”
During the second stage, when these students returned to China, they felt that China was going through the same process of “capitalization” other countries had experienced, says Mr. Zhang, and they were bitingly critical of the direction of the reforms. As a result, “they were viewed with profound suspicion at home,” he says. During the 1980s, when China was accelerating its program of economic reform, Deng Xiaoping famously said that the Communist Party had to guard against radicalism from the left more than from the right.
张说，在第二个阶段，这些学生回到中国，他们觉得中国正在走其它国家已经经历过的“资本主义化”的同样道路，他们对改革方向提出尖锐批评。结果，“他们在国内受到很深的猜疑。”在二十世纪八十年代，中国正在加快其经济改革步伐，邓小平提出了非常著名的口号：共产党必须防右，更要防“左”。
However, as China’s economy boomed and society became more stratified, these suspicions were overcome. “Now at the most recent stage the new left has become a pretty broad-based social movement. Maybe it’s an exaggeration to call it a movement, but it’s certainly a trend of like-minded people,” Mr. Zhang says.
然而，随着中国的经济繁荣和社会更加阶层化，这些猜疑都过去了。“眼下，最近的一个阶段，新左派已经成了基础相当广泛的社会运动。可能称之为‘运动’有点夸大其词，但无疑这是志同道合者的一个发展趋势，”张说。
Still, there remains great difference of opinion over what the new left stands for. One of the most central divisions is between thinkers who define the new left in terms of opposition to neoliberalism, which advocates free market capitalism, and those who see it as opposed to classical liberalism, which advocates individual freedoms. Wang Hui espouses the former view. “This is not a debate with liberalism, he says, explaining that the new left draws on a variety of intellectual resources including the liberal tradition. In his view the new left is really debating neoliberalism, and he suggests the term “critical intellectual” is more precise.
不过，在新左派拥护什么的问题上，仍有很大的不同看法。其中最主要的一种区分是：有些思想家认为新左派是鼓吹自由市场-资本主义的新自由主义（neoliberalism）的某种反对者，有些则视之为反对鼓吹个人自由的古典自由主义（classical liberalism）的对立面。汪晖赞成前一种看法。“这不是同自由主义的争论，”他解释说，新左派吸收了包括自由主义传统在内的各种智力资源。在他看来，新左派事实上是在同新自由主义争论，他并且建议说使用“批判性知识分子（critical intellectual）”这个术语更为准确。
Alternatively, Wang Shaoguang defines these camps in terms of Isaiah Berlin’s two concepts of liberty: “Liberals advocate a kind of 19th century freedom—freedom from, rather than freedom to. So they just want to be left alone by government control or intervention.” He describes the new left as advocating the opposite. “Not just freedom from government intervention, but freedom to have an equal chance at health, education, and many other things.” This group is more likely to include students of Marxist and Maoist thought.
另一方面，王绍光则利用以塞亚·伯林（Isaiah Berlin）的两种“自由”概念[2]来定义这些阵营：“自由主义者鼓吹一种19世纪的自由——‘免于……的自由（freedom from）’，而不是‘做……的自由（freedom to）’。因此他们仅仅是想要摆脱政府控制或干涉的自由。”他认为新左派鼓吹的是另外一种自由。“不单只是免于政府的干涉，更是在健康、教育以及许多其他事务上享有平等机会的自由。”这个群体更有可能包括了马克思主义和毛泽东思想的门徒（student）。
Further along the spectrum, some thinkers fall between the new left and the now largely irrelevant hardliners, or old left. One example is Gong Xiantian, a 72-year-old professor at Peking University Law School whose criticism is a big factor in the delay of the passage of the Property Law. An ardent Marxist, he describes China’s current political direction as finally tired of capitalism and ready to “go back to the good old days.”
沿着政治光谱更远一点，还有一些思想家介于新左派和如今很大程度上与新左派毫不相干的强硬派——或者说是老左派——之间。72岁的北大法学院教授巩献田（Gong Xiantian）便是一例，他的批评对延迟《物权法》通过是个很重要的因素。作为一名满腔热忱的马克思主义者，他形容中国当前的政治方向是终于厌倦了资本主义而准备“回到美好的旧时代”。
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Yet unlike leftist hardliners—whom one source described as old, marginalized and bitter—Mr. Gong is hardly irrelevant. His main bone of contention is that private-property rights are unconstitutional in China, a state founded on the idea of collective ownership. And when he speaks out, China’s leaders take note. “In [August] 2005 when I posted my essay [online], Wu Bangguo [chairman of the standing committee of the NPC] called me right up and we spoke for a long time,” he recalls. “And on Sept. 26 of that year they made an announcement concerning publicly owned property, emphasizing that China is still based on collective ownership.”
然而，很难说巩献田属于不相干者，这与左翼强硬派——有人形容他们年纪一把、早已边缘化、成天愤世嫉俗——不尽相同。他的争论要点在于私有产权是违反中国宪法的，中国是一个以集体所有制理念为基础的国家。并且当他大声讲出来时，中国领导人立马注意到了。“在2005年（8月），我（在网上）发表评论后，吴邦国（全国人大常委会委员长）很快召见了我，我们长谈一场，”他回忆说，“当年9月26日，他们发布了一项关于公有财产的声明，强调中国仍然以集体所有制为基础。”
As a result of such objections the law was amended to improve protection for public property, and a clause stating the law must not contradict the constitution was added. Interviewed the day after the seventh version was discussed in a closed session of the NPC, Mr. Gong said he had already seen the new version (which had not been made public at that time) and supported the changes and the draft.
由于此类反对，那份法律作了修改，以加强对公有财产的保护，还增加了一项条款，规定该法不得同宪法抵触。巩献田在接受采访时声称他已经看到了新的版本（当时并未公布），并对修改部分和草案予以支持，此前全国人大在一次闭门会议上对该法的第七版进行讨了论。
Mr. Gong’s experience suggests that communist ideals resonate deeply with China’s decision-makers. However, such an ideologically charged debate is the exception rather than the rule. Most of those interviewed for this article lamented that ideology was increasingly irrelevant to policy decisions.
巩的经历表明共产主义信念仍然在中国的决策者中拥有深切的共鸣。然而，这样一个充满意识形态的争论只是一场意外而不是惯例。接受采访的大多数人都哀叹意识形态同政策决定越来越不相关。
“The country is basically run by a bunch of engineers, the technocratic class,” says Mr. Zhang, the professor of literature at New York University. “The college students are less and less political,” he adds, expressing disappointment.
“国家基本上是由一群工程师主导，他们是技术官僚阶级，”身为纽约大学文学教授的张旭东说。“大学生越来越少地热衷政治。”他失望地加了一句。
Some see this as a crisis of cultural leadership. “The current leaders are really just feeling the stones to cross the river,” says Han Yuhai, an associate professor of literature at Peking University, referring to a well-known Deng Xiaoping dictum about gradualist reform. “We sometimes joke that the leaders walk with their heads down because they are looking for money lying on the ground,” says Mr. Han, whose academic work is influenced by Maoism. “The political crisis lies exactly here—China has no governance. The economy is the only government…. Money is the only ideology.”
有些人视之为文化领导权的危机。“现在的领导人确实是正摸着石头过河，”北京大学的文学副教授韩毓海（Han Yuhai）引用邓小平关于渐进式改革的一句名言说道，“我们有时候开玩笑说，领导人们都是低着头走路，因为他们在寻找躺在地上的金钱。”韩的学术工作受到毛泽东思想的影响：“政治危机就在眼前——中国没有管治。经济是唯一的政府……金钱是唯一的意识形态。”
But while the new left is critical of neoliberalism, they are not advocating return to a centrally planned economy. “They are not calling for a direct return to Mao’s countryside. Instead of that they are calling for a middle-of-the-road approach—a Scandinavian social model, the British welfare approach, or the U.S. model, the New Deal,” says Mr. Zhang.
然而，当新左派对新自由主义不满时，他们并没有鼓吹回归中央计划经济。“他们并没有提倡直接回归毛时代的农村。相反，他们正倡导一个中间道路——斯堪的纳维亚社会模式，英国式福利制度，或者美国‘新政（New Deal）’模式，”张旭东说，
Several new leftists see the reforms as initially beneficial, but less so as the human and environmental costs of China’s development increased. “The early economic reforms were a positive-sum game,” says Wang Shaoguang, “but by the late 1990s economic reform had become a zero-sum game.” As the state forced sectors like health care and education to become more market-driven, many people were simply left without the services they once enjoyed.
一些新左派认为改革初期是有益的，但随着中国发展所付出的人权和环境方面的代价不断增加，收益就少了。“早期经济改革是一场正和游戏（positive-sum game）[3]，”王绍光说，“但到90年代末，经济改革已经成了零和游戏（zero-sum game）。”当国家迫使诸如卫生保健和教育这些部门变得更为市场化时，很多人被简简单单地抛弃了，也丧失了曾经享有的待遇。
Wang Hui’s description of problems brought on by an overly eager embrace of open markets draws on the liberal tradition: “Market freedoms are only possible under the control of a government. So they can never be unlimited. China’s problem is that our lives have been too closely controlled. We need more autonomous space. We can’t have our lives controlled by the market.” He advocates greater “economic democracy” as a solution, for example by improving workers’ rights.
汪晖对由于过度热衷开放市场而招致的问题的描述则吸收了自由主义传统：“市场自由只有在政府控制下才可能。因此，它们从来不是无限制的。中国的问题在于我们的生活被控制得过严。我们需要更多的自治空间。我们不能让市场控制我们的生活。”它提倡实行更多的“经济民主”作为解决办法，比如说改善工人权利。
One area of particular concern for new leftists has always been the countryside, which they point to as a prime example of market-economy failures. Wen Tiejun, an agricultural economist at Renmin University, describes how he perceives China’s reform as having robbed the countryside of its labor and its capital, thwarting the necessary “three productivities”—Adam Smith’s land, labor and capital. He argues that China is a typical dual society, where the vast difference between urban and rural environments necessitates different policy approaches for the countryside and for the cities.
农村始终是新左派尤为关注的一块领域，他们视之为市场经济失败的最佳实例。中国人民大学农业经济学家温铁军（Wen Tiejun）描述了他是如何察觉到中国改革掠夺了农村的劳力和资本，从而阻碍了必需的“三大生产力基本要素”——亚当·斯密（Adam Smith）所谓的土地、劳力和资本。他认为中国是个典型的二元社会，城乡之间最大的差异必然要求针对乡村和城市采取不同的政策。
The reforms backfired because policy makers treated the countryside too much like the cities, he says. “Rural industrialization combined with rural townshipization is a valuable way to increase farmers’ incomes,” he says, adding that rural incomes grew faster than urban incomes in the 1980s. “There were no protests, no social conflicts [in rural areas]. The 1980s were a golden age. The social conflicts started because in the 1990s we didn’t progress in a way that was compatible with the realities in the rural areas. The implementation of the legal system, for example—this cannot really work in the countryside.”
他认为改革的事与愿违，是因为决策者对待乡村的方式与对待城市过于类似。“农村工业化结合农村城镇化是增加农民收入的重要方式，”他补充说，在80年代农村收入的增长速度超过城市，“（在农村地区）没有抗议，也没有社会冲突。80年代就是个黄金年代。社会冲突的出现是因为90年代我们没能找到一条与农村地区的现实相适应的道路。比如说，法律秩序的实行，这在农村事实上毫无作用。”
New leftists see China’s rural woes as vindicating the positions they have held for a long time. Wang Hui smiles as he explains how his journal helped break the story on rural Chinese poverty. “In 1999 Dushu printed a piece about the sannong (“three rural”) problem [referring to agriculture, farmers and the countryside]. At that time, the government did not even admit that the three rural problems existed, but two years later it was on the agenda of the NPC.”
新左派将中国农村的不幸视为自身长久以来所坚持的立场的一种证实。在解释他的杂志如何有助于透露中国农村贫困时，汪晖面带微笑。“1999年，《读书》发表了一篇有关‘三农’问题（指农业、农民和农村）的文章。当时，政府甚至不承认存在‘三农’问题，但两年之后这个问题出现在全国人大的议程上。”
Support From the Top
高层支持
In a sharp departure from the eras of Deng and Jiang, Messrs. Hu and Wen have differentiated their leadership style with symbolic gestures bound to please the left. After Mr. Hu was appointed president in 2002, one of the first places he visited was Xibaipo in Hebei province, the last place the Communist Party occupied before seizing Beijing in 1949. And Mr. Wen made headlines a few months ago by visiting farmers’ homes in the countryside of Liao-ning province on the eve of Chinese New Year, echoing his visits to coalminers on the same day of the lunar calendar in 2005. These expressions of solidarity with the working class and visits to revolutionary heritage sites pay homage to the country’s socialist past in a way that China’s leaders have not done for decades.
与邓小平和江泽民时代明显有异，胡锦涛和温家宝以其象征性姿态展示出不同的领导风格，这必然让左派感到高兴。胡在2002年当选国家主席后，首先访问的地区之一就是河北省的西柏坡，这是共产党1949年夺取北京之前最后的所在地。此外，媒体大字报道，几个月前的中国除夕，温在辽宁省乡村访问了农家，重演了在2005年农历同一天他访问煤矿工人的一幕。表现与工人阶级团结一致以及访问革命遗址这些行为是在以一种中国领导人数十年没有采用的方式向该国的社会主义昔日岁月表达敬意。
While this has undoubtedly helped the rising popularity of the left and the new left, many point out that it is too early to tell whether Mr. Hu truly shares leftist convictions, or if his policies and political gestures have just been motivated by pragmatism. “For the time being he’s just maintaining the status quo, so we’ll have to wait and see what he really believes in,” says a young woman in a leftist bookstore who asked to be identified by her screen name, Red Star Beauty.
虽然无疑这会有助于增强左派和新左派的声望，但很多人指出，要判断胡是否真正抱有左翼信念，或者其政策与政治姿态是否仅仅是出于实用主义还为时尚早。“目前他只是维持现状，因此我们不得不等一等，再看他到底信仰什么，”一家左翼书店的某年轻妇女说，她要求使用她的网络用户名（screen name）：红星丽人（Red Star Beauty）。
Others think that Mr. Hu has already shown his colors and will stick to them. Mr. Zhang describes the slogan “harmonious society” and Mr. Hu’s visits to communist heritage sites as “a very smart way of indicating a mild break from the Zhu Rongji model, which is very pro-business and very focused on the coastal regions, and a very good way to achieve some type of political identity.”
其他人则认为胡已经展现了其立场，并将坚持不渝。张旭东将“和谐社会”的口号以及胡对共产党遗址的访问描述成“一个显示同朱镕基模式——非常亲商，并极其专注于沿海地区——温和决裂的相当聪明的方式，以及一个获得某种政治认同的好方式。”
Mr. Han, the professor of literature at Peking University, sees Mr. Hu as similar to Mao Zedong in that both are homegrown intellectuals who began their careers at the grass-roots level—Mr. Hu spent 14 years working in Gansu province, one of China’s poorest areas. “Hu will be the most like Mao, compared to Deng and Jiang,” he concludes. Cynics, however, say Mr. Hu’s defining characteristic is a lack of vision, and that his apparent choice of political hues is simply the safest option for someone in his position.
北大的文学教授韩毓海认为胡与毛泽东类似，两人都是本国造就的知识分子，职业生涯都起自草根阶层——胡在甘肃省工作了14年，那里是中国最贫困地区之一。“相比于邓和江，胡将是最像毛的，”他断定。然而，愤世嫉俗者认为胡的本质特点是缺乏远见，而且他在政治色彩上的表观选择不过是居其位者最安全的一个选项而已。
Democratic Traditions?
民主传统？
Like Mao, the new leadership is emphasizing “democracy.” In the Communist Party context the word does not mean one person one vote, but rather greater mass participation in politics. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, Deng moved the Party away from broad-based movements that mobilized activists. Nobody expects a return to the bad old days of struggle sessions and Red Guard rallies. But many leftists would like to arouse more enthusiastic involvement in implementing Party policy.
像毛一样，新领导层也在强调“民主”。在共产党的文本中，该词并非指一人一票，而宁可说是指更大的群众政治参与。在“文化大革命（the Cultural Revolution）”结束之后，邓使得该党远离了动员行动主义分子的广泛运动。没有人希望回到那个糟糕的、充满批斗会和红卫兵（Red Guard）集会的旧时代。但是许多左翼分子意欲在执行党的政策过程中唤起更加热情的投入。
“We want to go back to the original meaning of democracy—rule by the people,” says Prof. Wang. In practical terms, new leftists have a variety of opinions about how this could be achieved. Prof. Wang describes scenarios of choosing a jury of citizens by lot to approve major policy initiatives, or participatory budgeting whereby town or village residents have a say in allocating the municipal budget.
“我希望回归到民主的最初含义——民治（rule by the people，人民当家作主），”汪说。实际上，新左翼分子对如何实现这一民主看法纷繁。汪描述了一些方案，如通过抽签决定出一个人民审查委员会来批准重大的政策提案，或者是公众参与编制预算——藉此，乡镇或农村居民在配置市政预算时也拥有发言权。
Others describe a democracy with a hint of socialism. “Democracy is not about procedure only,” says Mr. Zhang. “When you talk about democracy you have to talk about it in substantive terms like democratic distribution of wealth, or democratic distribution of social power.” Mr. Zhang sees this concept of democracy as being very different from the Western-style democracy advocated by Chinese liberals. “In China opponents of the new left tend to say, let’s have rule of law, let’s have elections, let’s play by the rules. That is a partial understanding of democracy.”
其他人则描绘了一种暗含着社会主义的民主。“民主不仅仅只是程序问题，”张旭东说，“当你谈论民主时，你必须在实际问题下谈论，比如财富的民主分配，或者是社会权力的民主分配。”张认为这种民主观念不同于中国的自由主义者们所鼓吹的西方民主。“在中国，新左派的反对者往往说，让我们拥有法治，让我们拥有选举，让我们按规则游戏。但那是对民主的片面理解。”
Thinkers across the new left spectrum criticize Western-style democracy, and many say they hope to learn from the mistakes that democratic countries have made. And by refusing to embrace elective democracy, new leftists believe they have the best interests of the masses at heart. “Corrupt officials are the ones who would benefit from Western-style democracy. In the future there is a chance that the nouveau riche could take advantage of capitalist-style democracy,” warns Mr. Gong.
新左派的思想家们批评西方民主，很多人表示他们希望从民主国家已犯的错误中汲取教训。此外，通过拒绝接受选举民主，新左翼分子相信他们是以最广大人民的利益为依归。“腐败官员都是那些将从西方民主中获益的人。未来，那些暴发户有可能会利用资本主义式民主。”巩献田警告说。
Mr. Zhang expresses similar reservations: “The new left advocates a sort of deeper democracy—it has to reach the masses, instead of only benefiting the urban middle class. Whereas the Chinese liberals have to equate democracy to rule of law, all of which is meant to legalize their newly gained social positions.”
张旭东也表达了类似的保留意见：“新左派提倡某种更深入的民主——它必须直达民众，而不是仅仅有利于城市的中产阶级。而中国的自由主义者必须将民主等同于法治，这一切都是意图将他们新近获得的社会地位合法化。”
Some new leftists perceive China as already moving toward the model of democracy they advocate. Wang Hui points to the discussions over the Property Law. “Several things are changing about the way China’s laws are being made,” he says. “In the past, policies were made from inside the government, but now more of those [policy initiatives] are coming from society.” He lists a number of factors that he says fundamentally changed the way society and government interact: the Internet and broader access to information; more intellectuals participating in critical debate; and economic growth. “When social conditions present the opportunity for such a discussion [as took place over the Property Law], that’s a good thing.”
一些新左派认为中国已经转向他们所倡导的民主模式。汪晖提及对《物权法》的讨论。“中国法律制定的方式已经出现了一些变化，”他说，“过去，政策都是政府内部制定，但现在更多的（政策提案）来自社会。”他列举了许多他认为从根本上改变了社会与政府之间相互影响的方式的因素：互联网以及更广泛的信息渠道；更多知识分子参与到批判性争论中；以及经济增长。“当社会条件提供了这样一个进行讨论的机会（就像在《物权法》问题上出现的那样），就是件好事。”
Despite these reassuring sentiments, contradictions emerge on topics like human rights and press freedom. Since Mr. Hu has come to power the state has progressively tightened its grip on journalists, and Beijing’s top universities have reduced the space for public expression of opinions. The Internet continues to be tightly monitored and restricted. And at this year’s NPC, discussion of the Property Law was conducted in closed meetings, and as of the time of writing the law still had not been made public.
尽管有这些令人鼓舞的感受，但在诸如人权和新闻自由的问题上仍存在矛盾。自胡锦涛执政以来，中国日益收紧对新闻记者的控制，北京的几所顶级大学也都压缩了公开表达意见的空间。互联网继续受到严密监控和限制。在今年的全国人代会上，对《物权法》的讨论都是在闭门会议中进行，并且直到本稿写作时尚未公布该法。
Mr. Gong says that an increasingly transparent legislative process and public involvement in debate over legislation are signs of “progress,” but he shakes his head at the way the NPC dealt with discussions of the law during the latest Congress.
巩献田认为，日益透明的立法过程以及公众对立法争论的参与都是“进步”的表现，但是他并不赞同全国人大在上次大会中对待法律讨论的做法。
“The fact that they’ve shut down debate indicates that they’re trying to avoid ideological discussion,” he says, a fact that others have linked to Messrs. Hu and Wen’s desire to avoid controversy in the run-up to this October’s 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, a once-in-five-years event that will most likely herald changes in China’s top leadership positions. Mr. Gong called the drafting process of the law “too secret” and said the way the NPC had gone about it “wasn’t right.”
“他们终止争论的事实表明，他们正设法避免意识形态的讨论，”他说，其他人则将此与胡温希望在今年十月中共召开“十七大”前能避免论战联系到一起，这件五年一度的大事最有可能预示中国最高领导层的立场变化。巩献田认为前述法律的起草过程“太秘密”，并认为全国人大的处理方式“不对”。
New leftists have a variety of reactions to discussions of press freedom, underlining the diversity of people to whom the label is applied. On the more moderate side, Wang Hui advocates ever greater space for discussion and suggests he has experienced firsthand how difficult media censorship can be. “I’ve been an editor for 11 years. I can’t use casual language to describe this experience,” he says, pausing. “Only by continuing to express your views can you expand the space for discussion.”
新左翼分子对新闻自由的讨论有着各种各样不同的反应，突显出贴有这一标签的人们的多样性。在较温和的一方，汪晖提倡不断增大讨论空间，他暗示自己已直接体验到媒体审查制度有多难处。“我做了11年的编辑，我无法泛泛而言去描述这种体验，”他停了会又说，“只有通过不停表达你的观点，你才能扩大讨论空间。”
Others seem less sure of where they stand, however. Like Wang Hui, Wang Shaoguang also said everyone should be allowed to engage in free speech. However when asked directly about China’s censorship of the Internet censorship, he gives a look that suggests surprise. “I have no such experience, and most of my friends in China can use the Internet in extremely productive ways.” And leftist hardliners go so far as to express their support for government intervention in the press. “There is definitely control of the media,” Red Star Beauty, a self-identified Maoist, tells me before excusing herself to join colleagues for takeout dinner in the back of the bookshop. “But this is necessary. It’s quite different from the U.S.—we need some guidance.”
然而，其他人立场暧昧，似乎不那么确定。像汪晖一样，王绍光也认为，应该允许人人言论自由。然而当被直接问及中国对互联网的审查制度时，他露出惊讶之情。“我没有这样的经历，我在中国的朋友中，大多数人都能以相当有效的方式使用互联网。”而左翼强硬派则走得很远，他们支持政府干预新闻自由。“对媒体是有明确的控制，”自称属于毛主义者的“红星丽人”告诉我说，“但那是必要的。这同美国完全不同——我们需要某些引导。”然后她离开去书店里面与同事一起去享用外带套餐。
Human rights are also not something new leftists bring up very often. “Human rights were not part of Mao Zedong’s worldview,” says Mr. Han, in the context of a discussion about China’s foreign policy, shortly before referring to a book famous for its anti-Western sentiment, China Can Say No (China Industry and Commerce Associated Press, 1996).
新左翼分子也不常提及人权。“人权不是毛泽东世界观的一部分，”韩在论及中国外交政策时表示，立马又提到因反西方情绪而闻名的《中国可以说不》（中华工商联合出版社，1996年）一书。
The irony is that only because human rights have improved in China do such intellectuals have the freedom to voice their dissatisfaction with a government that has largely succeeded in sidelining ideology. As the values of liberalism become more strongly entrenched, those who pine for the days of less economic and political freedom are able to reassert their views. Whether or not China’s leaders sympathize, this poses an added challenge to them.
具有讽刺意味的是，只有因为中国人权取得了改善，这些知识分子才能有对一个已基本成功地排斥了意识形态的政府表达其不满的自由。当自由主义价值得以更牢固的确立之时，那些渴望较少经济和政治自由时代的人们才能够再坚持其观点。无论中国领导人对此是否赞同，这都成了他们要面对的另一项挑战。
The question then becomes what sort of “great transformation” China is facing. In addition to having social policies, the country now has a debate over what they should be. The poor masses’ demands for greater social equity could lead to demands for a real say in how it is achieved. That is something neither the national leaders nor the new left would like to see.
那么问题就成了中国正面临怎样的一种“大转变”。除了拥有社会政策外，这个国家眼下对他们该做什么仍存有争论。穷苦大众对更大的社会公平的要求可能会导致他们对如何实现真正发言权的要求，而那是国家领导人和新左派都不愿看到的。
Ms. Hook is a Princeton-in-Asia fellow at the REVIEW.
虎克女士是在《评论》工作的“普林斯顿在亚洲（Princeton-in-Asia）”[4]项目成员。
[1] tipping point，“引爆点”。这个术语源自流行病学，指的是某种传染疾病达到超出任何控制其进一步传播的能力的“点”。因此，又常被认为是（并译作）一种“拐弯点”、“翻转点”、“踢爆点”等。《纽约客》杂志专栏作家马尔科姆·格拉德威尔在其所撰的畅销书《引爆流行（the tipping point）》中给出的定义是：“引爆点就是质变来临前的关键一点，就像沸点和临界点”。如今该词已经扩展到许多领域：记者把它应用到的社会现象，人口统计数据和任何可能导致其他影响的变化中。销售人员把它看作是会引起大量销售的开端。在某些应用中，“tipping point”只是它本身增加的意思，并没有额外的意思，但它出乎意料的成为会引起较大影响的额外改变的总量。在混沌理论的蝴蝶效应中，引起出乎意料结果的蝴蝶翅膀的小小挥动就是“tipping point”。然而，“tipping point”所引起的影响是立即可见的。当重要的条件都满足时，“tipping point”就会发生。能达到翻动点的事物包括：社会愿意忍受同性恋结婚，零售业的RFID技术和Web服务的广泛采用。如此等等。
[2] 以赛亚·伯林（Isaiah Berlin, 1909-1997），犹太人，英国哲学家和政治思想家，牛津大学获文学和哲学学位，1957年担任牛津大学政治理论教授，同年被授予爵士称号。1971年又被授予功勋勋章。此后曾任牛津大学沃尔弗森学院院长、英国科学院院长。伯林在1958年的“两种自由概念”一文中，对自由的概念进行了革命性的划分，将自由分为积极自由和消极自由两种。他认为，积极自由是指人在“主动”意义上的自由，即作为主体的人做的决定和选择，均基于自身的主动意志而非任何外部力量。当一个人是自主的或自决的，他就处于“积极”自由的状态之中（LIBERTY TO……）。这种自由是“做……的自由”。而消极自由指的是在“被动”意义上的自由。即人在意志上不受他人的强制，在行为上不受他人的干涉，也就是“免于强制和干涉”的状态(LIBERTY FROM……)。在伯林看来，积极自由强调的是主体活动的主动性和自治性。而消极自由的重点在于外部力量没有对主体形成束缚和控制，未受到他人的干涉。两种自由概念的划分，明确地提出了自由制度的基本理念上的两种思路。
[3] “零和游戏”（Zero Sum Game）、“负和游戏” （Negative Sum Game）或“正和游戏” （Positive Sum Game），搏弈论原理。两人对弈，在大多数情况下，总会有一个赢，一个输，如果我们把获胜计算为得1分，而输者得-1分，那么，这两人得分之和就是：1+（-1）=0。零和游戏原理揭示的实质是这种游戏的输赢双方的游戏总成绩永远是零。社会生活中有太多的情况与零和游戏有类似的局面，胜利者的喜悦建立在失败者的痛苦之上，胜利者的光荣背后隐藏着是失败者的辛酸与苦涩。“负和游戏”是指，博弈双方虽有一方获胜但付出了惨重的代价，得不偿失，可谓没有赢家。“正和游戏”是指，赢家所得比输家所失要多，或者没有输家，结果为“双赢”或“多赢”。
有关“零和游戏”，有个有趣的故事：有两个经济学家，在马路上边散步边讨论经济问题。甲经济学家突然看见了一堆狗屎，思索着对乙经济学家说：“你如果吃了这堆狗屎，我给你100万块钱。”乙经济学家犹豫了一会儿，还是经受不住诱惑，遂吃了那堆狗屎。当然，作为条件，甲经济学家给了他100万块钱。过了一会儿，乙经济学家也看见了一堆狗屎，就对甲经济学家说：“你若是吃了这堆狗屎，我也给你100万块钱。”甲经济学家犹豫了一会儿，也经受不住诱惑，吃了那堆狗屎。当然，作为条件，乙经济学家把甲给他的 100万还了回去。走着走着，乙经济学家忽然缓过神来了，对甲说：“不对啊，我们谁也没有挣到钱，却吃了两对狗屎！”甲也缓过神来，思考了一会儿说：“可是，我们创造了200万的GNP啊！”
[4] Princeton-in-Asia，“普林斯顿在亚洲”。19世纪90年代晚期，“普林斯顿大学费城协会”曾为天津和北京的基督教青年会（YMCA）提供了相当的支持。随后，普林斯顿大学的毕业生受邀到中国来，为的是“联合发展和保护一个伟大民族的最巨大的资源――强壮的年轻人”。 听从了这一召唤的普大毕业生们在天津成立了当地第一所高中，在北京创办了商业金融学校。他们还组织了很多夜校和娱乐活动，还在全国的赈灾活动中起到了突出的作用。所有这些努力演化成了一个长期的、世俗的志愿者和交流项目，即现在所说的“普林斯顿在亚洲”（Princeton-in-Asia，PiA）。PiA始终致力于作为亚洲各国和美国之间相互理解的一座桥梁，并帮助“需要美国人来教课和/或者提供专业技能的亚洲机构”和“合格并且很希望提供服务的美国人”之间建立起联系。PiA独立于普林斯顿大学的，它的资金来自私人捐款、校友网络以及拨款。目前，PiA每年资助65位年轻的老师和专业人士到中国、日本、香港、哈萨克斯坦、韩国、马来西亚、新加坡、台湾、泰国、老挝、越南等地工作。平均下来，每年派到中国的实习生约为20到25人，在中心城市或者农村地区从事不同领域的活动：教英语、在非政府组织或者在商业/法律领域内工作。PiA安排的大多数实习生是刚刚毕业的学生，他们一般会在亚洲上述国家呆一年，也有一些职位可以选择再延长一年。
作者：仰望星空 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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