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bug
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简好!!
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作者：bug 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
| 简 写道: | | 别介，您可别把咱往社会责任感什么的圣坛上推， 这不是为了咱女性能在父系社会里公平点儿讨生活而已。 |
佩服你的勇气啊, 二鞠躬!!
其实你也不用着急: 这坛里有happy marriage的几个人早就有
不同看法了.
那文中的LP是不挣钱的. (因为那Deal不成就没钱了.) 那文中的LP
在家里一点实权都没有的: 居然LG拿两人的共同财产去吃喝嫖赌快
花完了都不知道, 还想着度假.
(人善又不挣钱的, 嫁大陆男的不是好出路...)
另外, 万一这deal不成? 他们怎么办? 再卖房子再去吃喝嫖赌再忽悠
下一个deal? 那女儿住哪里呢? 那父爱呢?
作者：bug 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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安普若
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你的问题问得好？就和当初有人问：那120万美元的投资哪里来？
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作者：安普若 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
有了那个问题，才使读者看到今天。那叫“悬念”。
今天，你问：“万一这deal不成? 他们怎么办? 再卖房子再去吃喝嫖赌再忽悠下一个deal? 那女儿住哪里呢? 那父爱呢? ”
这也叫“悬念”。
你是了好读者，跟着作者的悬念走。
其实，不用happy marriage的人，有不同看法看法是正常的。
只是，不知道什么叫happy marriage？是不是LP在家里有实权就是happy marriage？
作者：安普若 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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d3d4
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加入时间: 2005/05/05
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厉害，你的错误就越多我的错误就越多，今天还多赚一个，嘿嘿，校长，你还有多少错误？
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| 安普若 写道: | | 你有捉不完的错误，我就有送不完的美女。因为美女就是错误。 |
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dougskywalker
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Mei Nv Shou Dao. Hen PP!! Xie xie Xiao Zhang!!
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| 安普若 写道: | | 你说的对！谢谢！我记混了这两个词了。 |
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齐寒
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外行，看了还是不懂，请校长解释一下
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1.照我理解他们变出来的钱是融资从外头圈来的，但是合资的本意不光是捞钱，更是排雷，这么干虽然大家发了点财，但是心头之患不还留在那里吗？
2.包博在北京活的那个真叫排场，这么骗上150万恐怕是连个本也捞不回来吧？
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安普若
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尘土之上
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加入时间: 2004/10/07
文章: 40
海归分: 20402
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安校,不改变天地就只能安于现实了吗?
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作者：尘土之上 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
| 安普若 写道: | | 你对男性的思维方式很理解。我同样理解你的社会责任感——因为我也曾经有过改天换地的雄心，但现在没有了。。。 |
我现在很痛恨"达则兼善天下,穷则独善其身"这句话，搞得人好象只能有这两个选择似的.在我看来,"兼善天下"有几个人做得到?觉得做不到后，大多数人便心安理得的去"独善其身".跟这句话的指导不无作用吧?我就知道还有第三条道路:
作者：尘土之上 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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尘土之上
头衔: 海归少校
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我倒觉得男女不平等的问题是派生的,不是问题的根本所在
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作者：尘土之上 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
| 安普若 写道: | | 几千年了，乐观的估计还要持续几千年。想改变这个状况的有人在，但到头来男人还是男人。 |
基本上中国现在以丛林法则为主导,没有法律或舆论或别的什么力量保护弱者.女性相对于男性是弱者,就好象农民相对于城市人是弱者一样的道理。根本还是在于民主人权......当然，虽然是派生问题,但与根本问题的相关度不是1,有兴趣的人还是努力改变现状.大事咱做不了,小事可以做呀.似乎是黑龙江的一个女人，也没读多少书，被丈夫长期虐待,打得半死,她后来终于跟丈夫离婚,还自学成了律师.她后来免费帮助那种被丈夫虐待的女人打官司.能做这一点也很好啊.一句"改变不了社会"就算完吗?大家都这么想，这个社会甭想改了.
安校的描写我看得平静.对我的同胞们,我以前很容易哀其不幸，怒其不争;哀多了怒多了,自然会麻木一点;对我的国人,也同样如此。我现在不管别人怎么样，也管不了别人怎么样,我只管我自己,我也做不了大事,就做点小事吧,如果能像那个黑龙江女人一样做那么多，我就会为我自己骄傲.
作者：尘土之上 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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linghu
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Bob Sun's interpretation of asset securitization
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作者：游客 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
One of the critical legal aspects in asset securitization is that the assets are actually "sold" to a special purpose vehicle which is controlled by the investors (the so-called "true sale" concept.). The original company does not own the assets any more but typically is retained as the manager or the servicer of the assets and could be replaced upon investors' request if the assets are not performing well. Practically this is a rare event since the original company is the one who knows the assets best.
Maybe Bob Sun is just doing some "hu(1) you(1)" here when he says the assets are not actually sold in the securitization. Or maybe he (Or principal An) actually refers to the "project finance" which has a similar economic nature as the securitization but very different legal framework
作者：游客 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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水泊苍风
头衔: 海归少校
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校长，举手提问：就算是资产证券化，那么所得资金的所有权不也是ISSUER的？BOB怎么才能合法的用这笔钱去MBO国外的控股公司？是设计一个合同吗？谢谢！
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haolin
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不明白，董厚明可以向bob 要公司资产证明，存款证明，这bob不就一下露馅了，为什么绕那么多弯子来看bob有没有钱。
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安普若
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在美国或是中国，哪个机构可以给一个公司出资产证明？银行？会计事务所？
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作者：安普若 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
| haolin 写道: | | 不明白，董厚明可以向bob 要公司资产证明，存款证明，这bob不就一下露馅了，为什么绕那么多弯子来看bob有没有钱。 |
有多少人见过一个美国公司的存款证明？
美国的银行怎么给一个美国公司写存款证明？截止到某月某日，某公司在我们这里有100万存款？
作者：安普若 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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安普若
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你讲的资产证券化中某些形式，比如MORGAGE的证券化，MORTGAGE是被SOLD了。再比如不良资产的证券化，不良资产也被SOLD。但是。。。
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作者：安普若 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
| linghu 写道: | | Bob Sun's interpretation of asset securitization |
你上次讲到过高速公路的项目的证券化。具我所知，高速公路本身并没有被SOLD，只是他的门票收入被SOLD的。
在比如明斯克航空母舰公园，也只是他们的门票被SOLD的。资财没有被SOLD。
作者：安普若 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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安普若
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来自: 中国美国的飞机上
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你说得对！后面会写具体如何操作的。看了就明白了。
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| 水泊苍风 写道: | | 校长，举手提问：就算是资产证券化，那么所得资金的所有权不也是ISSUER的？BOB怎么才能合法的用这笔钱去MBO国外的控股公司？是设计一个合同吗？谢谢！ |
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Leolee
头衔: 海归少将 
加入时间: 2005/02/23
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我还是有个问题
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作者：Leolee 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
| 安普若 写道: | | 在美国或是中国，哪个机构可以给一个公司出资产证明？银行？会计事务所？ |
如果董没有象BOB预料中的那么信任他，多少要出一点钱。比如
50,60万美金拿出来看看，BOB有预备方案么，这个钱从哪里来？
如果bob没有任何准备的化，那这一步真是走的有点险了。
作者：Leolee 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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安普若
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一些关于TRUE SALE，SPE等的摘录。
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作者：安普若 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
| linghu 写道: | | Bob Sun's interpretation of asset securitization |
What's different between securitization and loan?
What are the features of a securitization?
There are two features are common to most legitimate securitizations: (i) the transaction was one where financial assets (such as accounts receivable) were "sold . . . with the intention of removing them from the estate of the debtor,", and (ii) at least one tranche or class of securities to be issued in the securitization was rated "investment grade" by one or more nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSRO), when the securities were initially issued.
The "originator" of financial assets in a securitization transfers those assets to a "special purpose entity" (SPE), which is usually owned completely or substantially by the originator. When it works — and it appears to work much of the time — securitization is attractive because it eliminates the risk that these financial assets will be subject to the claims of the originator's other creditors. In theory, reduced risk results in cheaper financing.
What is "true sale"?
For risk to be truly reduced, the transfer of financial assets must be a "true sale." The problem for securitization providers is that courts have struggled for many years and in many different contexts to determine when a transfer of financial assets is a "true sale."
Variants of the true sale problem animated decisions such as Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925), Octagon Gas Sys. Inc. v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve Inc.) , 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993), and In re LTV Steel Co., 2001 Bankr. Lexis 131 (Feb. 5, 2001).
In all three cases, the courts held that the transfers were not what they purported to be. Thus, the financial assets remained property of the debtors' (that is, originators') bankruptcy estates, and the debtors' creditors had access to these financial assets after all.
Perhaps the most disquieting aspect of the treatment of the true sale problem is the so-called "put" feature: A transaction would qualify as a statutory securitization even if the originator retained the obligation to repurchase defaulted assets from the SPE. For example, the originator retained the obligation to repurchase the assets when they did not perform.
This creates two problems. First, it defies economic reality. It would treat a securitization transfer as a "true sale" even if the originator bore risks typically associated with a loan, because the SPE could "put" defaulted assets back to the originator.
Defying reality (economic otherwise) is not, however, necessarily a problem. Our law is generally indifferent to a contract where you and I agree to call my cat a dog. Rather, the second, and more troubling, aspect of the "put" would flow from the fact that third parties would undoubtedly rely on the (misleading) contractual characterization rendered by the parties.
Enron Case:
According to the Enron Report, Enron used hundreds of SPEs to hide assets and liabilities from public scrutiny. An article in the New York Times explained the problem concisely: "The same financial tools used to create asset-backed securities [securitizations] were also used to construct the elaborately camouflaged and booby-trapped partnerships that have been blamed for Enron's collapse." Diana B. Henriques, "The Brick Stood Up Before. But Now?," New York Times (March 10, 2002).
Enron's Chewco, JEDI and LJM partnerships, for example, all appeared to involve SPEs and financial transfers or sales of Enron financial assets in what were characterized as "true sales" by Vinson & Elkins, Enron's law firm. What is unknown is whether any of these transactions were rated investment grade by an NRSRO. A recent story in the New York Times suggested that some may have been. "Enron's Deals Were Marketed to Companies By Wall Street," New York Times, C1, C9, Feb. 14, 2002.
If so, then at least some of the Enron partnership transactions would meet the two statutory criteria for securitization treatment: They would have involved (i) "true" sales, in (ii) transactions rated (presumably investment grade) by an NRSRO.
作者：安普若 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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安普若
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这里有一个synthetic securitization的文章
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作者：安普若 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
| linghu 写道: | | Bob Sun's interpretation of asset securitization |
RISK, SYNTHESIZED
Securitization has been largely avoided in Asia. A new instrument now gaining ground may get the practice rolling
By Diane Lam
The Asian financial crisis cut deep holes in the balance sheets of many Asian banks. Now, after a long, bumpy journey, the banks are on the mend. But the world in which they operate is miles apart from the 1990s boom years. Banks are more cautious, their prudence being helped along by new Basel Accord standards and stronger local regulatory regimes. Responding to these pressures, bankers are imposing new measures of performance, such as risk-adjusted return on capital and portfolio diversification. They are also being more disciplined in their use of bank capital.
This caution is manifest in what Asian banks are not doing. By and large, the region's financial institutions are avoiding the well understood, readily available tool of asset securitization. This is a shame, because securitization is beautiful in its simplicity and has many merits. Under securitization, banks can transfer risk off their balance sheets and free up capital. A typical approach to the practice is to bundle together assets, such as the receivables from a portfolio of mortgages, and sell them off to investors via bonds issued by a company set up for the purpose (a special purpose vehicle or SPV). The SPV would issue secured bonds to investors to raise funds to buy the porfolio. These bonds are non-recourse and transfer the risk of the assets to investors.
The practice has gained wide acceptance in the US and Europe, but in Asia its slow progress has been a disappointment to local CFOs. Securitization is a tool that would add much-needed liquidity to local capital markets. In South Korea, for example, banks turned to securitization following a stringent period of bank restructuring, adding an extra measure of liquidity in the post-chaebol loan market. South Korean finance companies raise funding almost entirely using securitization to tap low-cost funding.
Elsewhere in Asia, banks still avoid the practice for many reasons. Securitization is still developing and faces legal, tax and regulatory hurdles in some nations. In some jurisdictions, authorities require banks to obtain the consent of the borrower before packaging and selling the loans. This stricture impedes the time-honored Asian tradition of close-knit, long-standing relationships between bankers and clients. Bankers worry that informing the borrowers of a decision to securitize will imply that the borrower is regarded as a risk, and they are unwilling to convey that impression.
Banks in the better developed markets of Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea suffer from excess deposits and are more concerned about keeping loan assets than divesting them. Many Asian banks showcase their non-performing loan (NPL) ratios as evidence of tackling bad loan problems - and securitizing performing assets would only worsen the NPL ratio. Last, banks are often deterred by the longer time and potentially higher costs of completing a securitization.
Fortunately for Asia, there is an alternative instrument available, bearing many of the benefits of straightforward securitization, but skirting the difficulties. Called synthetic securitization, the basic structure involves a transfer of risk from a bank to investors via notes sold by an SPV. The key difference between it and the flesh-and-blood model is that these instruments do not involve the transfer of a physical asset, only a risk on the asset, through the use of credit default swaps. The bank buys protection against default from investors and an SPV, which issues the notes to investors and sells default swaps to the bank. The SPV uses the funds raised from investors to buy collateral, such as government bonds, which are in turn used to cover any losses on the default swaps. As losses are incurred, the investor assumes this loss and their notes are written off by the amount of the loss.
In other words, in a synthetic securitization, the bank buys credit risk protection, while the investor buys credit risk exposure. The benefits over and above traditional risk management tools are tremendous, especially in Asia. Firstly, synthetics do not involve any transfer of assets. Because of this, they avoid many of the taxation and other issues to which securitization is prone. This makes the synthetic version comparatively quick and easy to set up. More than that, the practice allows banks to bundle assets from different jurisdictions into one transaction. Many banks in Asia operate in a number of different markets in the region, with many of these operations being too small in scale to be suitable for securitization individually. These local operations are often very capital constrained as a result. The synthetic structure allows banks with this problem to offload risks on a regional basis, freeing up capital and greatly improving overall risk management.
Second, these structures allow banks a certain access to regional and global banking franchises, without the expense and time of building physical networks. In addition to managing the risk on their own portfolios by selling on portions to outside parties, banks in Asia can become investors in the synthetic securitizations of banks in other countries. This would, for example, give a Hong Kong bank exposure to consumer or corporate credit markets not only in Korea, but even California or Germany.
Finally, the nature of synthetics makes risk management much more responsive to changing business environments and strategies. Typical bank assets, such as project finance loans, have relatively long maturities. Especially in Asia, where the secondary traded loans markets are very thin, these assets are virtually fixed on a bank's balance sheet until maturity. By liquefying such assets, a bank's risk management improves greatly. No longer must a business line be prevented from seizing promising new opportunities because it is unable to secure capital internally from the bank. No longer can banks only adjust their risk profile through cumbersome disposals.
DBS Bank in Singapore, Mizuho Bank in Japan and ABN Amro in Hong Kong have all recently blazed the trail of synthetic securitization in Asia. Today, they are very much the exceptions. In fact, Asian banks are natural buyers and originators of this risk management tool, which enables them to meet multiple strategic objectives cheaply and efficiently, making them more locally and regionally competitive. Though just a trickle at present, synthetic securitization may just overtake traditional securitization in Asia as bankers here grasp the implications. The advantage would not be to bankers - and the health of their capital ratios and liquidity of their balance sheets - alone. The region's CFOs would benefit from the opportunity to customize, diversify, and add and subtract credit risk from their portfolios.
Diane Lam is director, structured finance ratings, Standard & Poor's, Hong Kong
作者：安普若 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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老大爷
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安普若
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加入时间: 2004/02/21
文章: 26038
来自: 中国美国的飞机上
海归分: 4196257
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好象国内司机嘴里的习惯说法，“迈”就是公里/小时。
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| 老大爷 写道: | | "这车跑85、90迈一点问题没有"应是公里吧 |
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xibker
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Cashflow can be treated as asset
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作者：游客 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
| linghu 写道: | | Bob Sun's interpretation of asset securitization |
The asset to be securitized could just be the projected revenue from the business in question, Not real "hard asset" such as ships or land. It is very common in the developed capital markets such as US to issue this kind of security.
For example, credit card companies are often sell their credit card receivables (projected FUTURE payment from credit card holders --- interests from their outstand credit balances to credit card issuer) to invstors.
I think Bob could well be using the same concept by selling off just the future cash flow (from revenue of the Mr. Dong's company) to investors via the offshore investment company.
作者：游客 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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