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 [转帖]美国与金融新世界 |
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tahiti
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作者：游客 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
华尔街日报中文网络版 2008年10月09日
Zachary Karabell
(Editor's Note: Mr. Karabell is president of River Twice Research. His latest book, 'Chimerica: How the United States and China Became One,' will be published next year by Simon & Schuster.)
Soon enough, America's financial crisis will wind down -- maybe in a month, maybe in a year. Yet regardless of when, this crisis marks the beginning of a new era for the U.S. For more than six decades, from the end of World War II in 1945 until now, the U.S. was the hub of global capital and capitalism. In the years to come, it will remain a vital center, but not the center.
In 1945, after an exhausting three decades of exertion against Germany, the United Kingdom emerged militarily victorious only to see itself economically exhausted. A year later, it was bankrupt, unable to find capital and on the verge of collapse. It had nowhere to turn but the U.S., which then dictated terms that amounted to a withdrawal of Great Britain from the world stage. The U.S. is not yet in the position of Great Britain, and our creditors in China are not yet as we were then. But absent a more humble and realistic attitude toward capital in Washington, that is the path we're headed down.
What is happening to finance today is similar to what happened to manufacturing beginning in the 1970s. Until then, U.S. manufacturing accounted for as much as half of all global output. By the 1970s, Germany and Japan began to exert themselves as manufacturing titans. So did Taiwan, Singapore, Korea and others that had benefited from American aid. The globalization of manufacturing continued, and was accelerated by the information technology revolution of the 1990s. While the U.S. today continues to produce a decent share of global manufactured goods, it is one among many and employs only 13 million people (10% of the workforce) in a sector that in the middle of the 20th century accounted for a third of all jobs. The same thing is now happening with finance.
In the past five years, there has been a transfer of wealth from the U.S. and Europe to Asia, the Middle East and Russia of trillions of dollars for oil and raw materials as well as inexpensive manufactured goods. Whether or not that transfer has been positive or negative for the U.S. economy writ large -- and there is considerable debate on that subject -- the outflow of wealth is a fact.
You can argue that the transfer of dollars to goods-producing countries, China above all, has provided American consumers with products that might otherwise be unaffordable but has had a negative effect on the U.S. labor force. The transfer of wealth to oil producing states and countries rich in ba<x>se me<x>tals has been an economic drain, especially as the price has spiked and the cost has risen.
That wealth transfer occurred just as the U.S. financial system began to expand its exposure to the housing market. The movement of capital away from the U.S. was one reason hungry banks turned to more absurd forms of leverage. That disguised the erosion of real capital.
Even as that was happening, however, American financial institutions still wore the mantle of global leadership. As China, the Gulf region, India, Brazil and other parts of the world have increased in affluence, they relied on the expertise, acumen and advice of Wall Street. Go to any region of the world and you will find central banks and investment banks staffed by people educated at U.S. business schools and graced with resumes that include time at the formerly premier institutions of Wall Street. Few major deals were brokered without involvement from a U.S. bank or access to Wall Street financing. That is now at an end.
It is at an end for two reasons. One is structural. There are now vibrant economies that don't depend on the U.S., are not heavily levered, and have a burgeoning, confident and ambitious middle class. But it is also at an end because those newly affluent regions of the world do not find the U.S. a welcoming home for capital.
There is no small irony in the fact that state-driven capitalism, which is the norm in the Persian Gulf and China, finds the U.S. too restrictive. Sovereign wealth funds, with enough cash on hand to bail out Wall Street and the U.S. housing market many times over, invested billions a year ago but are now saying no.
Uncertain growth for the United States is one reason. But the nature of the American regulatory regime is also to blame. Sarbanes-Oxley and the Patriot Act -- whose antimoney laundering provisions had the unintended consequence of repelling legitimate investors -- combined with a tax code that places a heavy burden on corporations doing business in the U.S. has meant that, as the wealth transfer has happened, there is less and less inclination for global institutions to place that capital in the U.S.
This is a fact regardless of whether you believe that a high corporate tax rate is morally and fiscally correct. In truth, because of the differentials between high U.S. corporate taxes and the rates in Europe (lower) and Asia (in places nonexistent), even U.S.-listed companies that operate globally keep their profits outside the U.S., and thereby avoid those high taxes altogether.
In addition, the regulatory requirements of listing a company in the U.S. have led many companies to look to other markets and other exchanges for financing, hence the boom of financial centers such as Hong Kong, Dubai and even London.
This should not be a partisan argument. It is perfectly fair to argue that wealthy corporations should pay a greater share of the tax ba<x>se than struggling middle-class Americans. Fair, but not realistic. The U.S. government can no longer dictate to global capital. Once, when the U.S. was the engine of global growth, when the world needed Wall Street for funding, capital could be taxed and controlled by the fiat of the U.S. government. No longer. The U.S. may have the will; it does not have the power.
The current debate in Washington gives no indication that this reality is understood. Both sides of the aisle are susceptible to a false sense of American economic sovereignty. Companies and countries flush with cash increasingly view U.S. laws, regulations and attitudes as undue burdens. As consumer activity accelerates outside the U.S. and Europe, and as financial centers spring up elsewhere, there is increasingly less inclination and less need for the world to go either to Wall Street or to Main Street.
For now, even with the breakdown of Wall Street, the U.S. remains vital to the global economy. It is the largest market, with a dynamic consumer culture, innovative companies, and is deeply enmeshed in the international system. But it is not the alpha and the omega; it is not the center; and the crisis hitting Wall Street is leading the rest of the world to form bonds that bypass the U.S.
Not all of this need by an absolute negative. In a truly interconnected world, more affluence and activity globally can be a universal benefit. U.S. companies operating outside the United States and Europe have already been reaping the rewards. But failure to accept the new reality will lead to the worst of all worlds.
As the U.S. government plunges into the markets, we must understand that this is the end of an era, and that attempts to unilaterally force capital to stay here will only lead to its continued flight. We are now one market among many, a huge and affluent one to be sure, but a wise nation recognizes both its strengths and its limitations. A more secure domestic capital ba<x>se depends on the U.S. being seen as a desirable place for investment, and not as King Lear raging against the storm, alone, deluded and abandoned.
▀ 美国与金融新世界
2008年10月09日10:14
Zachary Karabell
很快，美国的金融危机就会告一段落──这可能需要一个月，也可能需要一年。然而，不管何时结束，这场危机对美国而言都标志着一个新纪元的开始。从1945年二战结束到现在的这六十多年来，美国一直是全球资本和资本主义的中心。今后，美国仍将是一个重要的中心，但不再是唯一的中心。
1945年，经过与德国三十年的艰难对抗，英国在军事上凯旋而归，但在经济方面却变得山穷水尽。一年以后，英国垮了，找不到资本，经济也濒临崩溃边缘。除了向美国求助，英国别无他法。美国于是开出了那些最终令英国退出世界舞台的条件。美国现在还没有沦落到英国的境地，而作为美国债权人的中国也还没有我们当年的实力。不过，由于美国政府对待资本缺少一种更为谦卑和现实的态度，我们正走向英国当年的老路。
当前金融业的景况与上世纪七十年代初期制造业的情况类似。在此之前，美国制造业的产量占到了全球总产量的一半。到了上世纪七十年代，德国和日本开始成为制造业巨头。台湾、新加坡、韩国以及其他得益于美国援助的国家也后来居上。制造业的全球化不断发展，九十年代的信息技术革命更是加快了这一势头。虽然美国如今仍然在全球的制成品市场占据可观的份额，但却绝非独占鳌头。美国现在制造业的从业人员有1,300万（占美国劳动力的10%），而在二十世纪中叶，美国制造业创造了全国三分之一的就业机会。金融业眼下正经历着类似的情况。
在过去的五年里，数万亿美元的财富从美国和欧洲转移到亚洲、中东和俄罗斯，为美欧换回了石油、原材料和廉价的制成品。这些财富的转移对美国经济而言究竟是利是弊广受关注──就这一问题还有许许多多的争论──但财富的流出却是不争的事实。
你可以说，向产品生产国──尤其是中国──的财富转移为美国消费者提供了那些否则将难以负担的商品，但对美国劳动力市场造成了不良的影响。向盛产石油以及贱金属的国家的财富转移造成了美国的经济消耗，尤其是当这些资源价格高企，成本上升的时候。
这种财富转移发生之时正值美国的金融系统开始更多地介入住房市场。美国的资本外流是如饥似渴的各家银行转而寻求更为怪诞的杠杆融资方式的一个原因。这掩盖了实际资本的流失。
然而，即便如此，美国的金融机构依然摆出全球领袖的架势。中国、海湾地区、印度、巴西和世界上的其他地区变得日益富足起来，它们依赖着华尔街的专业知识、敏锐视角和建议。去到世界上的任何地方，你都会在那里的央行和投资银行里发现毕业于美国商学院、曾在华尔街重要金融机构工作过的员工。几乎没有哪个大笔交易能和美国银行或者华尔街融资脱得了干系。现在，这种情况一去不复返了。
这主要有两个原因。其一是结构性原因。现在出现了充满活力的经济体，它们不依赖于美国，没有那么高的杠杆，而且充满自信和雄心壮志的中产阶级也正在那里蓬勃兴起。其次，美国金融机构一统天下的局面之所以终结，还因为这些新发展起来的地区并不认为美国是资本的好去处。
奉行国家主导资本主义的地方──比如波斯湾地区和中国──觉得美国有太多的限制，这简直是天大的讽刺。主权财富基金一年前还在美国投入了数十亿美元，它们拥有的现金足以拯救华尔街和美国房市好几次，而现在居然说“不”。
美国经济前景不明朗是原因之一，但美国监管制度的特性也难脱罪名。《萨班斯-奥克斯利法案》(Sarbanes-Oxley)和《爱国者法案》 (Patriot Act)中的反洗钱条款无意间让合法的投资商望而却步。此外，美国的税收制度也给在美经营的企业造成了沉重的负担。所有这些都意味着，当财富转移发生之时，越来越少的国际机构愿意把资本投放到美国。
无论你认为企业税的高税率在道义上或财政上讲合理与否，这都是事实。实际上，由于美国的高企业税和欧洲（低）及亚洲（在一些地方根本不征收）企业税率的差别，即使是在美国上市的跨国公司也把利润置于美国之外，从而避免缴纳高额的税款。
此外，监管体制对在美国上市公司的要求迫使许多公司转向其他市场和交易所融资。这推动了香港、迪拜、甚至伦敦等金融中心的蓬勃发展。
这不应该是一场党派之争。让富有的美国公司──而非为生计操劳的中产阶级──承担更大一部分的税基当然是言之有理。有道理，但却不现实。美国政府再也无法对全球资本指手画脚。曾几何时，当美国是世界经济增长的引擎，当世界需要华尔街的资金时，美国政府可以用自己制定的规则对资本征税，并进行控制。现在情况不同了。美国可能有这样的愿望，但已经没有这样的能力了。
眼下华盛顿的辩论表明他们还没有看清楚这个现实。辩论双方都容易陷入美国经济主权的错觉。手握大量现金的公司和国家越来越将美国的法律、规定和态度视为不必要的负担。随着消费活动在美国和欧洲以外地区日益活跃，以及其他金融中心蓬勃发展，全球资本投放到华尔街或美国实体经济的意愿和需求都变得越来越小。
眼下，即便华尔街分崩离析，美国对全球经济来说依然至关重要。美国拥有全世界最大的市场，充满生机的消费文化，致力于创新的公司，而且还紧密地融入到了国际体系之中。但美国不是全部，也不是唯一的中心。而且华尔街遭受的金融危机正在促使其他国家结成绕开美国的联盟。
所有这些并不都是完全负面的。在一个真正相互依存的世界里，更多的财富和全球性的活动都可能成为全人类的福祉。在美国和欧洲以外运营的美国公司已经从中获益。但是如果不能接受新的现实，那么结局将不堪设想。
随着美国政府注资救市，我们必须认识到这是一个时代的终结，试图凭借一己之力强留资本的做法只会导致更多的资本流失。我们现在是众多市场中的一个，当然美国市场仍然庞大而富足，不过一个明智的国家不仅仅会看到自己的优势，也会认识到自己的不足。一个更为可靠的国内资金基础依赖于美国被视为理想的投资目的地，而不是像李尔王(King Lear)那样独斗风雨，被蒙蔽、被抛弃。
（编者注：本文作者是River Twice Research总裁。他所撰写的《美国与中国如何合二为一》(Chimerica: How the United States and China Became One)明年将由Simon & Schuster出版。）
作者：游客 在 海归商务 发贴, 来自【海归网】 http://www.haiguinet.com
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 [转帖]美国与金融新世界 -- tahiti - (10398 Byte) 2008-10-10 周五, 10:57 (1723 reads)
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